Transformation of Resource Conflicts. Approach and Instruments

A Contribution of the SPPE Project ECOMAN
(Environmental Conflict Management)

Günther Baechler

Discussion Forum North-South, Basic Documents No. 3
© 1999, Interfakultäre Koordinationsstelle für Allgemeine Ökologie,
Universität Bern

Introduction

The authors of the previous papers published by the Discussion Forum North - South stress the fact that conflict management [1] is a constitutive element of resource management. Further more, participatory approaches, i.e. the active involvement of stakeholders and actors, are perceived as preconditions for effective conflict management. As a consequence, different techniques and methods can be applied in order to enhance participation as well as to strengthen conflict management capacities. In Northern countries, "negotiation platforms", "consensus conferences", "co-operative discourses" are quite widespread instruments today [2] whereas in the Southern context, "action-planning workshops", "stakeholder workshops" and community-based methods such as "participatory rural appraisal" have been proven to be successful methods [3].

The two contributions on partnership in local resource management and on participatory approaches in order to deal with related conflicts prepared the ground on which we can elaborate on the following questions posed by the Discussion Forum; these are as follows:

• What are typical patterns of resource use and distribution conflicts and related processes?
  
  
• Which approaches to conflict management at the local level both, in rural and urban communities, are relevant or innovative?
  
  
• How is the specific role of "participation" to be defined in resource conflict management (instruments and mechanisms)? [4]

In order to answer the three inter-related questions the contribution is divided into three parts: the first part focuses on various types of resource conflicts; the second part deals with different approaches; and the third part highlights ways of participation. Since the paper chiefly deals with participatory approaches an emphasis is put on part two and three. Here, the concept of "conflict transformation" is introduced which substantially differs from conflict management and conflict resolution.

Our basic hypothesis is that resource management and conflict "management" are closely intertwined. Both domains are imbedded in a socio-culturally preformed natural environment which is under constant change. Therefore an approach integrating resource and conflict management on one hand and relating it to the dynamics of process-structures on the other seems to be most adequate to address the topic at stake here. These also means that the instruments used in participatory resource management and those developed for transformation of conflicting relationships among stakeholders, actors, and the wider public are quite similar.

This can easily be demonstrated by describing in more detail the interactive problem solving workshop which is a well developed method in order to resolve protracted international and civil conflicts. This method combines three essential elements of conflict transformation: it is based on empirical research; it is genuinely participatory; and it is action-oriented. Above this, it enables the moderators to bring together stakeholders and actors from various societal and political levels.

1. Types and Patterns of Resource Use
and Distribution Conflicts

Correlations between transformation of societal-nature relationships and conflicts, be them violent or not, are numerous. In order to highlight different patterns of causation, to select types of environmental conflicts in terms of different pathways leading to violence, as well as to stress the sociopolitical characteristics of environmental conflicts one has to build on prepared empirical ground.

As a set of about forty area studies undertaken in developing countries has clearly indicated the correlation between violence and environmental degradation is relatively weak to the extent that other factors such as, for instance, poverty and poor state performance are relevant too [5]. Therefore "environmental conflicts manifest themselves as political, social, economic, ethnic, religious or territorial conflicts, or conflicts over resources or national interests, or any other type of conflict. They are traditional conflicts induced by environmental degradation. Environmental conflicts are characterized by overuse of renewable resources; overstrain of the environment's sink capacity (pollution); and impoverishment of the space of living". [6]

This conception of environmental conflict underlines, firstly, that the interdependence of structures and actors determine the conflict pattern that is triggered by environmental issues. Secondly, it focuses on renewables resources and, thus, excludes minerals and non-renewable resources. However, if mining, dam building, or industrial activities directly or indirectly lead to widespread disruption of landscapes, than, these conflict-prone activities constitute cases which fit into the definition.

Patterns of Potentially Violent Environmental Conflicts

1. There is ample evidence for correlations between rural poverty, environmental stress in rural arenas, and discriminated access to resources. These factors coincide with political instability, i.e. non-democratic change in regimes and/or violent conflicts and wars. These findings primarily apply for the least developed countries, secondly for countries with medium development characterized by poor state performance and unstable political conditions.
   
   
2. Environmentally caused violence is hardly found in interstate relations. Although climatic change, ozone layer depletion, and loss of biodiversity have created global conflict lines which did not exist until recently, no major catastrophe threatens the world immediately. "Climatic world wars", mass flight due to rising ocean levels, military crusades by northern countries against destruction of tropical rain forests, and Atlantic "fishery wars" may rather remain threatening blusters than lead to virulent conflict situations with a high risk of escalation.
   
   
3. Arenas of environmental conflicts are most often domestic ones. They encompass distinct strategic groups using and overusing one or more ecoregions, subdividing ecoregions through political boundaries, or migrating across such boundaries. Acute conflicts that tend to become violent constitute a kind of address-scale North-South conflicts within the countries concerned. Countries with high percentage of labor force in agriculture, little cropland availability per capita, and low commercial energy consumption per capita belong to the group of countries with both high environmental stress as well as violent conflicts or wars going-on.
   
   
4. Degradation of landscape may lead to violent conflicts if and when it accentuates structural heterogeneity which tend to discriminate chiefly against those rural producers who are the victims of bad resource allocations, unequal resource distribution, high dependence on natural capital, and bad state performance outside the federal district or national capital areas. The widening gap between the modern sector, where state performance concentrates on, and the marginal sector, which encompasses poverty clusters in sensitive environments, constitutes a fault line which in many places has become a real front line of environmentally caused violent conflicts .
   
   
5. Conflicts about degraded renewable resources manifest themselves as transboundary, center-periphery, inter-regional, and group identity struggles exacerbated by migration and displacement, and in some cases accelerated by population dynamics. Actors with access to state power typically have access to the most productive arenas, whereas "identity groups" (ethnic groups, clans, lineages) facing environmental discrimination are forced to use, divide, and subdivide marginal arenas with low productivity, thereby only perpetuating impoverishment. Additionally, groups against which environmental discrimination works are confronted with environmental deterioration beyond their control: e.g, deforestation by loggers destroys the livelihood of indigenous forest dwellers, dam building degrades land both upstream and downstream, mining leads to widespread contamination of the landscape.
   
   
6. As a rule the resort to violence only occurs if and when some of the following five key situations coincide: Inevitable environmental conditions, this is when group survival is dependent on degraded resources for which no substitutes are apparent; scarcity of regulatory mechanisms and poor state performance, as far as a political system is incapable of producing certain social and political conditions, whereas sustainable resource use is far from being attainable; instrumentalizing the environment, in terms of using the environment (and its destruction) in order to pursue specific group interests so that environmental discrimination becomes an (ideological) issue of group identity; opportunities to build-up organizations and find allies, this is when actors organize and arm themselves in political settings - often behind a strong leader - and gain allies. Rural actors capable of waging conflict need powerful coalition partners from different social levels to support their goals, for instance, part of the intelligencia, members of the middle class, or a charismatic leader of an ethnic minority at risk; spill-over from a historic conflict, as far as environmental discrimination occurs within the context of an existing (historic) conflict structure and, as a result, the conflict receives new impetus. These five contexts constitute the arena for actors who choose violence as their best alternative to non-violent activities.

Many environmental conflicts currently occur between stakeholders in local arenas. However, quite often external actors are involved. Therefore, local conflicts may have a national or transboundary impact [7]. On the other hand: conflicts over scarce resource may often not turn into violent action. Indeed there are significant cases where stakeholders prove to be unwilling or unable to join a group with strategic goals; various communities and identity groups have virtually no capacity to refer to collective violent action. Different reasons account for these outcomes: marginalization, lack of means and organizational skill, lack of leadership, state repression, poor health conditions, wide-ranging apathy, fatalism, defeatism, and religious mystification at one's own situation.

The specific socio-political and socio-cultural circumstances - and not the degradation of the environment as such - determine what kind of environmental conflict the observer is confronted with. Resulting from the case studies mentioned above the following conflict types are to be grasped

To further reduce the high complexity created by the diversity of fault lines and actors, the seven conflict types were assigned to specific causation patterns which share a address number of common indicators. Thus I got three general patterns that accelerate socioeconomic, environmental, and political heterogeneity either within states or internationally:

1. marginalization of poverty as a pattern drawn from cases where poverty segments of societies in transition are forced to produce in marginal ecozones (arid zones, steep slopes, remote mountain arenas, etc.);
   
   
2. national and international sacrifice arenas drawn from cases where central governments - often together with multinational firms - develop islands of modern industry degrading remote ecozones used and traditionally owned by indigenous groups, subsistence farmers, address-holders, or other coherent groups;
   
   
3. High international dependence drawn from cases which reflect international power asymmetries resulting from a) unequal access to fresh water resources by upper and lower riparian states or b) unequal distribution of environmental pollution effects between producers and recipients.

2. The Conflict Transformation Approach

Environmental conflict management has been evolving only recently, i.e. in the last twenty or so years. In practice, it is often characterised by the application of general conflict management principles to environmental conflicts. These are:

• a non-adversarial framework,
  
  
• an analytical approach,
  
  
• a problem solving orientation,
  
  
• the direct participation by the conflicting parties,
  
  
• moderation or facilitation by a trained third party. [8]

From Track One to Multi-Track Conflict Resolution

Among the non-organisational or non-governmental approaches two branches of civilian conflict management methods are to be distinguished:

Multi-track conflict management has grown from the realisation that the repertoire for dealing with protracted and/or intense conflict has to be broadened"[9]. Alternative dispute resolution, unofficial conflict management, interactive problem solving are further methods describing different aspects of this field of conflict transformation. In comparison to traditional diplomacy, they all are of a more participatory and long-term nature.

Track one means the official diplomacy, the intergovernmental relations, whereas track two is defined as "informal interaction between members of adversarial groups or nations which aim to develop strategies, influence public opinion, or organise human resources in ways that may help resolve the conflict" [10]. The conceptualisation of multi-track diplomacy by Diamond and McDonald (1991) extended the rather bivalent track one/ track two approach in order to grasp the wide cross section of society that can be involved in both conflict causation and resolution. Such comprehensive and to some extent complementary conflict management approaches grew out of the fact that official diplomacy is limited, especially in "deep-rooted" and "protracted conflicts" within fragmented societies. [11]

The multi-track approach allows for great flexibility. Consultation in such informal settings, for example, switches from pre-negotiation to negotiation to conflict analysis, forth and back. It enables for new input when a deadlock has been reached. The transfer of conflict management options developed in non-governmental settings to the governmental level is one of the main challenges of such approaches, often leading to a focus on unofficial, but highly influential stakeholder representation. E.g., some of the participants of interactive problem solving workshops organised by Herbert Kelman in the Israel / Palestine conflict moved on to become members of the official negotiating teams in the Oslo process.

The multi-track approach, similar to the organisational approach, aims at the institutionalisation of conflict management results, too. The 'point de depart', however, is different. The inclusion of a wide cross section of stakeholders gives greater priority to participatory involvement, aiming at building a foundation from which institutional co-operation may be effective. The top-down approach, governments and external influence (e.g. UN), are thus linked to and strengthened through the inclusion of the civil society, the bottom-up approach. In order to limit the complexity of involving more stakeholders there is a need to concentrate on representatives of different positions of civil society, and those stakeholders and actors directly relevant to the conflict.

In a position of deadlock in intergovernmental diplomacy, multi-track conflict management allows to analyse conflict issues on a more academic level, leading to new openings, visions, and provocative thinking. Stakeholders and actors in an unofficial setting are often more flexible, giving room for new ideas. In order to reduce complexity and retain a political impact mid-level leaders are involved, these have connections to policy makers so that political transfer is given.

The Role of Third Parties

Traditionally, the roles of third parties were limited to authoritative and coercive forms of handling conflicts as in the role of a judge or the police. For African traditional conflict management, e.g., arbitration and adjudication are typical. Here, the function of judgment and reconciliation is practiced by one or a collective of authority figures. "The purpose is not to render a judgment in law but to reconcile the conflicting parties and reintegrate the offender in the community and its norms". [12]

This being said, one has to be aware that mediation by a neutral, powerless, and wise agent is also a widespread traditional African phenomenon. It is a "moral mediator rather than a mediator with muscle, or in more standard terms, a mediator as formulator but not as manipulator. The mediator functions much as an ombudsman, intervening between authority and citizen, tempering justice with mercy and sentences with reintegration." [13] The so-called western methods, in other words, have their roots in African societies at a communal or local level. Its forms rely less on decision-making power and enforcement capabilities by the third party and more on participation and communication between the parties to a dispute, the idea being that disputants solve their differences themselves. If this was not possible, the third party should exercise as little coercive power as necessary.

For social activists, these newer or forgotten forms of conflict management respectively promised to be a tool to empower those on the margins of society: blacks, women, the poor, the disabled. What is at stake is nothing less than the activation of civil society for the prevention and resolution of conflicts which shall finally bring about global civilization. [14]

Understanding what the third party does to bring about the desired goals is a critical step toward unlocking the diversity of third-party assisted conflict resolution processes. Third-party intervention has been an important topic of inquiry for scholars from different disciplines in the social sciences and related fields. As a result, a significant body of literature has accumulated considering third-party intervention from diverse perspectives, and illuminating different facets of the process.

Most generally stated, a third party is an individual or collective that is (often) external to a conflict and that tries to help the conflicting parties to reach an agreement [15] . How this can be achieved depends largely on

• the nature of the conflict,
  
  
• the issues at stake,
  
  
• the parties, and
  
  
• the nature of their relationship.
  

Popular accounts of third-party intervention often emphasize the variety of tasks and strategies intermediaries use to facilitate settlement. Some conceptualize third-party activities in terms of roles, others in terms of strategies. Pruitt and Rubin, as an example, offer a dichotomous set of roles an intermediary can play. They distinguish formal vs. informal roles, individual vs. representative roles, invited vs. non-invited roles, impartial vs. partial roles, advisory vs. directive roles, interpersonal vs. intergroup roles, and content-oriented vs. process-oriented goals[16]. Stulberg lists the following as third-party roles: catalyst, educator, translator, resource-expander, bearer of bad news, agent of reality, and scapegoat [17]. Susskind and Cruikshank introduce a more dynamic typology by relating the different roles of a third party (a mediator in their case) to the various stages of the intervention process. Each role (e.g. representation, fact finding, inventing options, monitoring) has its place in the conflict cycle so that intermediaries fulfill a range of roles during their engagement. Susskind and Cruikshank's typology is more in tune with third-party practice. As conflicts change in terms of intensity, of the issues at stake and of the relationship among the parties, so do intervention roles, behavior and strategies. [18]

Third parties intervene on three levels of a given conflict: on the level of the relationships, on the level of the process, and on the level of the content or outcome. The termination or resolution of a conflict is only one in a range of potential goals of conflict intervention. The improvement of the relationships among the disputants or the design of an effective and just dispute settlement process might be a more realistic goal of intervention than the resolution of the conflict itself. A third party will choose its approach according to the emphasis given to each of these three levels. The selection or design of a conflict management process depends not only on the goal(s) the third party wants to achieve but also on the nature of the conflict or to be more specific on the stage the conflict is in.

In an African context, where there is no authority, reconciliation is accomplished by negotiation. However, as Zartman argues negotiation in African traditional conflict management is carried out by groups or councils representing the parties; the parties do not negotiate on their own behalf but their representatives are in a higher position of authority. "These groups collectively bear responsibility for the act of their member, and collectively help provide the compensation". [19]

On the other hand, the methods are used in Africa within a very integrative or positive-sum spirit, in which conflict is viewed as a disruption of the community whose integrity needs to be restored. While this may require a punishment that is on the surface indistinguishable from Western sentencing, the overall goal appears quite different. Conflict is resolved by reincluding the offending member within the community, rather than excluding the guilty party.

Now, a challenge is the operation of traditional practices in areas where a strong community relation and spirit do not exist, such as inter-group or against-system conflicts. "The harmony and time-honed practices of reaffirming social cohesion which characterised intra-community conflict management had no equivalent in inter-community relations."[20] Zartman in is most recent book made the following observations:

"When traditional conflict management has been applied to inter-community conflicts, it works by building relationships where none exist. Marriage and hostages were simple devices for building relationships when conflicts were located on a personal level, and even the widespread use of gifts was effective in creating dependencies of indebtedness that were so important in traditional relations. When conflicting parties are not tied together by shared values and interdependence, both aspects need to be created for conflict management agreements to be more than just a punctual exercise. Building interdependencies makes it impossible for parties to walk away from each other or to renew conflict without damaging themselves. Activities in turn require norms to govern their ongoing functions, so that a normative base is gradually grown. The effectiveness of traditional conflict management depends on the existence of a relational and value context." [21]

The point Zartman makes basically is that relationships among the conflicting parties permit but do not guarantee success in conflict management. They are necessary but not sufficient. Why this is so will be explained in the section below dealing with the environmental context of conflict management.

Before this the third category of conflicts that highlights the experience of traditional conflict management in African societies should at least be mentioned here. According to Zartman it is the conflict against the community. In such conflicts challenges to the authority are at the same time challenges to the community itself. Both sides, the ruler and the pretender try to mobilize their own network of relationships and values while they intend to undo the same network arrayed behind the opponent - be it a real or a perceived one. Against the community conflicts are fundamentally authority-destroying as they turn against the central elites and structures seeking to delegitimize both of them. Traditionally rebellions and contests of authority are met with oppression, forced displacement or fighting. Zartmans observation that "the spirit of conciliation stops at the seat of the ruler" can only be confirmed. With only few exceptions indeed, "nothing in African traditional practices gives any help in dealing with conflicts against the community. Yet this is the type of conflict that is most prevalent at the present time." [22] In ECOMAN publications dealing with conflicts both within and among peoples like the Borana, the Somali, and the Oromo we could demonstrate that this holds true for those cases analysed by our research team.

The Environmental Context

As mentioned above environmentally induced conflicts are the result of transforming societal nature relationships. As such they form part of the socio-economic and political changes in Third World countries mentioned above. This also means that the transformation approach to conflict management is most appropriate to the topic at stake here.
Beyond this, there are some specific aspects of the environmental context worth mentioning. The following properties of international environmental conflict transformation can be summarised:

1. A multiplicity of parties and delegations are represented in the negotiations;
   
   
2. Issues are not limited to environmental problems, but encompass economic, social, cultural, and political dimensions;
   
   
3. As a tendency boundaries - be them between states or sub-national territorial areas - are "ignored" by environmental changes; this is the very point why they might become meaningful for stakeholders and actors;
   
   
4. A joint problem definition and problem solving approach among stakeholders and actors is hard to create since scientific data and their interpretation are uncertain;
   
   
5. There is commonly significant power asymmetry among the stakeholders and actors involved;
   
   
6. A long time frame is necessary to be able to deal with the complexity of the environmental conflicts. One has to address both the transformation of inter-group as well as the societal nature relationships;
   
   
7. In order to be sustainable solutions need to be institutionalised and financed properly. They have to become part of the socio-cultural setting and value system." [23]

These points taken together demonstrate the complexity of environmental conflict management, and the broad approach needed to confront the challenges involved. The organisational approach to conflict management has concentrated mainly on the last point, namely that solutions must be institutionalised. Many of the forgoing points, however, cannot be addressed sufficiently by organisational, functional, or managerial approaches. [24] This mainly holds for environmental conflict management in an African context where the empirical background of this paper is drawn from. Why is it so?

First, African societies are under tremendous changes. Socio-economic changes include urbanisation vs. depopulation of rural areas, modernisation of central district areas vs. marginalization of agricultural areas, job creation in urban areas vs. lack of off-farm opportunities in the country-side, etc. Political changes encompass such diverse things such as centralised authoritarian regimes vs. weak or failed states with a lack of central authority. The common denominator of all these changes is that the civil society, because of a lack or a breakdown of institutions, is urged to build on its own capacities.

Therefore, conflict resolution has to deal adequately with so-called process-structures. The notion of process-structure stems from a modern scientific concept used to describe phenomena in nature that are, at the same time, process and structure." [25] It reflects the changing character of both the societies as well as the issues at stake. Thus, conflicts are not seen as single events that could be addressed with a narrow manager's approach but, rather, as necessary and as integral part of transforming society-nature relationships. This is why transformation of such process-structures has been proposed as the most appropriate method and philosophy in order to intervene with the necessary sensibility. "Transformation insinuates that something not desired is changing, taking new form. When we add conflict transformation to peace-building we push the metaphor further. We embrace the challenge to change that which torn us apart and building something we desire." [26] The desirable goods are to be created in a momentum of peace which is difficult to predict or to define in all its components. It has to take the long history of process-structures and their constant change into consideration. It has to be interpreted in the light of a comprehensive view of socio-economic, political, and cultural changes.

In the broad spectrum of conflict handling mechanisms, Hizkias Assefa proposes methods such as mediation and reconciliation to be the very conflict prevention and transformation tools.

The term "transformation" is used in the following for another reason. The notion also suggests that traditional and innovative conflict management approaches are complementary, instead of placing traditional and alternative methods as separate and unconnected modes.

3. 'Interactive Problem Solving Workshop' as a Method to Transform Resource Conflicts

The Interactive Problem Solving Workshop (IPSW) is a specific type of third-party intervention of particular use to inter-group conflicts. There is some debate in the literature whether IPSW should be distinguished from mediation at all [27]. This is not merely a semantic issue since it has consequences on how one evaluates the approach. As a rule of thumb, one could say that mediation is agreement-oriented, whereas problem solving is educational. As such it can prepare the ground for negotiation, facilitation, and mediation.

The IPSW has been developed over a time span of more than 25 years by John Burton, Herbert Kelman and other scholars. [28] IPSW is an unofficial, academically based, third-party approach to the analysis and resolution of both international as well as domestic (inter-group) conflicts. It is anchored in social-psychological principles. It follows a scholar/practitioner model the interaction of which is crucial to the process. This basically means that the workshop practice is informed by theoretical analyses and empirical studies of conflict, social influence, and group interaction. Those experiences gained in interactive practice, in turn, contribute to conflict theory building. It also serves the evaluation and refinement of the intervention concept. In other words, the IPSW represents an integration and continuing interaction between practice, research, and theory building. [29]

IPSW brings together politically influential members of conflicting parties in a private, confidential setting for direct, noncommittal communication. In the words of Kelman:

"Workshops are designed to enable the parties to explore each other's perspective and, through a joint process of creative problem solving, to generate new ideas for mutually satisfactory solutions to their conflict. The ultimate goal is to transfer the insights and ideas gained from these interactions into the political debate and decision-making processes in the two communities." [30]

According to Kelman, problem-solving workshops are not negotiating sessions and they are not intended to simulate and certainly not to substitute for official negotiations. It is exactly their unofficial, non-binding character that clearly distinguishes them from formal negotiations. The latter can exclusively be carried out by officials authorized to conclude and sign binding agreements.

At the same time, IPSW and comparable mechanisms for interactive problem solving are closely linked to negotiations. They may play an important complementary role at all stages of the negotiation process:

• in the pre-negotiation phase, they can help to create a political atmosphere conducive to movement to the round table;
  
  
• in the active negotiation phase, they can help - parallel to formal negotiations - in overcoming obstacles to productive negotiations and in framing issues that are not yet on the table;
  
  
• and in the post-negotiation phase, they can contribute to implementation of the negotiated agreement and to long-term peace building.

It is precisely the non-binding or informal character of workshops that is the source of their unique contribution to the larger - formal - negotiation process: "They provide opportunities for sharing perspectives, exploring options, and joint thinking that are not readily available at the official negotiating table". [31]

The goal of IPSW is twofold: On the one hand, the workshop is designed to facilitate direct interaction between the parties. Participants are encouraged to talk to each other rather than to their constituencies or to third parties, and to listen to each other in order to develop empathy for the antagonist's perspective. On the other hand, the workshop tries to promote an analytical, problem solving focus. The workshop is designed to change perceptions and attitudes, to discover shared interests underneath exclusionary positions, and to produce common ideas for resolving the conflict. A further aspect is the transfer of these changes and ideas back into the political debate and decision-making process within each constituency.

The participants of an IPSW come together in an isolated setting and engage in face to face communication - such as in the famous Oslo process which dealt with the Middle East peace process in the quiet fjords of Norway. Participants are unofficial but highly influential representatives of the conflict parties. However, IPSW idealistically is conducted in an academic context. It is usually led by a panel of experts who bring their knowledge about the socio-psychological aspects and the dynamics of conflict to the IPSW-process. It is their task to follow the content as well as the dynamics of the talks. They also inform the participants how their behavior affects the perceptions of the other parties. The IPSW basically resembles a laboratory experiment in which the participants can learn how their interaction might reflect the dynamics of the conflict between their constituencies in the "real world". One of the advantages of an academic context is that it allows the utilization of academic norms that favor open discussion, attentive listening to opposing views, and an analytical approach.

The selection of the participants is a central feature of the process. In general, it is best to select participants who are politically influential but not directly involved in the execution of policies. When it comes to the selection of participants there is always a dilemma. On one hand: The closer the selected participants are to the top level of decision making power, the more constraints they will have or feel to have and the greater their difficulty to become engaged in an open and free dialogue. At the same time it is obvious that high level representatives will be more influential when it comes to reporting back to their constituencies the feedback of what they have experienced. On the other hand: Selected participants who are not very close to governmental power, will certainly be less restrained than the more powerful colleagues. They might more easily change their views during the process of learning form each other. However, they will have more problems feeding back the results to their constituencies in a credible and convincing manner.

Nevertheless, the philosophy behind the problem solving approach is that violent action or peaceful thinking or cooperative behavior are learned phenomena. And what is learned can also be modified. Therefore, it is crucial to the success of IPSWs that the moderator create the framework conditions for adaptive and progressive learning. Thus, e.g., conflict transformation will be more productive if the participants are not restrained by disturbing enemy images or if the parties are willing to address perceptions and misperceptions: "While conflict arises out of objective and ideological differences, the escalation and perpetuation of conflict is typically fuelled by factors such as misperception and distrust." [32] In this sense IPSWs mobilize cognitive as well as emotional imagination.

However, one has to admit that the problem solving approach proved not be useful in any case. Not all conflicts are the product of misunderstandings and misperceptions, nor do there always exist compelling shared interests between the parties. [33]

The Moderator of IPSWs as Process Manager

The moderator/s of IPSWs do/es not propose solutions but rather, support/s the communication process among the parties. Nevertheless, they must be knowledgeable about both conflict theory as well as the conflict in question. They most know when, how, and why to intervene when the process is threatened or when a deadlock occurs. As a mediator they have to manage the process in order to create the environment for a free exchange of views and interests. As such they foster the search for solutions which, in any case, have to be found by the parties themselves.

Four participants from each conflict party and three third party members (moderators and experts) has proven a workable number. Workshop duration is normally approximately five days. The IPSWs Herb Kelman organised for the parties in the Middle East took place over a period of several years .

The conflict is examined co-operatively from an analytical viewpoint as opposed to the polemic approach. The conflict is seen as an object that can be addressed in a constructive way. The German notion "konstruktive Konfliktbearbeitung" is quite adequate and is often used in the English literature, too. No participant is allowed to be quoted by name about anything said during the workshop; the so-called Chatam House rules is applied. This basic rule contributes to an open atmosphere that, in turn, allows for exploration of new ideas. Parties sooner or later start to see the opponent beyond the stereotype preconceived pictures usually formed. In this sense the IPSW lays the ground for a micro-representation of the macro-conflict out there.

In the following some of the constituting rules and principles are listed:

• Privacy and confidentiality; no positions are to be publicly attributed to any of the participants.
  
  
• Open and analytical discussion; discussion aims to concentrate on conflict causes and dynamics, rather than on engaging in polemics.
  
  
• Expectations: There should be no pressure, e.g. from the third party, to reach consensus results.
  
  
• Proposals and results are not to be presented by the moderator/s or experts; options and solutions have to be explored and designed by the parties only.
  
  
• The parties are responsible for the feedback process "at home".

According to the five principles above the moderator's role is more the one of a facilitator rather than of a mediator. This means that the discussion is to happen between the conflict parties, not between the parties and the third party. [34]

Finally, IPSWs are also and chiefly to be seen as a form of action oriented, participatory, and applied research. With their educational and scientific approach on the one hand and their soft conflict intervention approach both theory and practical steps are integrated and therefore highly interdependent. In an ideal setting theoretical considerations and field studies inform conflict intervention strategies (problem-solving, palaver, training and consultation, mediation, reconciliation). Simultaneously, the practice of soft conflict interventions feed back to the theoretical discussion. This organised procedure guarantees a constant evaluation of research and practice and allows to feed constantly new findings to the process.

Because of this approach IPSWs are not seen as an intervening party in the sense of a stakeholder. IPSW are co-actors without muscles and coercive power. The strength lies in the voluntary and confidential setting that only allows the parties to explore a common horizon without being quoted or blamed. Mainly in sensitive conflict arenas the search for common ground functions well as a door opener for interaction that previously did not take place. Moreover, it stimulates discussions on issues never addressed before because they were perceived as too sensitive or explosive.

When IPSWs are taken seriously by the participants as well as by the official track one diplomacy they constructively contributed to conflict transformation.

4. Application of IPSWs in Environmental Conflict Transformation

IPSW because of its unique and transformative character is an ideal method to be applied in the field of environmental conflict management. The ECOMAN project as part of the SPPE will use the ISWP approach in the next phase of its action oriented research programme. It focuses on the Blue Nile in East Africa. The topic will be the international water use and distribution conflict between downstream riparian Egypt and the upstream riparian Ethiopia. Another conflict that might be addressed by another group of the ECOMAN team in the Horn of Africa is a subnational - partly local - conflict concerning the development of the Woyito river located in Southern Ethiopia; however, this is subject of further discussions.

Water shortage proves to be one of the main environmental problems world wide and therefore prone to violent conflicts. Especially in arid or semi-arid regions current water demands are often not adequately satisfied; population pressure and environmental degradation are likely to exacerbate the problem. In many areas, cooperation over international river basins is rudimentary, ineffective or still totally lacking. Research has clarified generalised principles and rules supporting adequate river management. The question of how to apply such principles to concrete cases, however, is still not sufficiently answered. Therefore, we think, a successfully introduced method such as IPSW should play a role when it comes to the exploration of cooperative and reasonably ways of water use and sharing.

The interdisciplinary research project ECONILE aims to develop and assess the effectiveness of a "dual conflict transformation approach" to international rivers. Why "dual"? The dual approach enables a separate in-depth analysis of the upstream and downstream conflict perspectives in the Blue Nile basin (Sudan and further secondary stakeholders will be integrated only in a later stage of the process).

The Nile Basin was chosen as the case study on which to test this applied participatory approach. Research in the basin has concentrated mainly on technical and intergovernmental co-operation; the long term conflict potential is estimated as being high. Situated in an arid region, riparian states in the Nile Basin are extremely dependent on the Nile river as their water resource. 95% of Egypt's water stems from the river Nile. With the onset of Ethiopia's microdam development strategy, the delicate relations between the countries of the basin have gained new significance. Egypt perceives Ethiopia's development plans as a direct threat to her main water source. Ethiopia in her turn does not accept the 1959 agreement between Egypt and Sudan, since she was not party to the agreement, despite the fact that 86% of the Nile water stems from the highlands of Ethiopia. [35]

The ECONILE project starts with a general diagnosis of the water conflict. The aim is to get an independent expertise on what the conflict between Egypt and Ethiopia is all about: historically, politically, technically, etc. This expertise serves as background information to the moderators of the IPSWs that will follow the initial phases.

In the second phase the following activities will be carried out separately by the research teams:

• Archive research in Egypt & Ethiopia (and to a lesser extent in Sudan);
  
  
• assessment (with written standardised questionnaires & half standardised interviews) of the perceptions, positions and management options proposed by a wide cross section of stakeholders. This will be the basis for narrowing down the number of stakeholders, with whom the round table meetings will be carried out;
  
  
• development of the material gained, e.g. by cross fertilising the different stakeholders positions and applying impact assessment instruments to clarify the outcome of the proposed conflict management options. This development of the gained material (using methods listed below) is to serve as an input to the round table workshop;
  
  
• round table workshop between different stakeholder within each country, organised by the Center for security Studies & Conflict Research and the Swiss Peace Foundation in connection with local conflict research institutes. This will include an input from the research carried out (e.g. impact assessment). The aim is to clarify the intrastate interests, to create a basis upon which fruitful interaction with the "opponent" in phase three can occur;
  
  
• renewed assessment of the perceptions and positions of the round table participants. If the interests have been clarified and if the breadth or realiseability of proposed management options have been increased, the round table meetings and research input can be considered as being positive;
  
  
• criteria for the effectiveness of different methods will be developed in phase two, based on the round table meetings and their assessment, and will be used in phase three to support the assessment of the Interactive Problem Solving Workshop. [36]

After having carried out the separate analysis by two Ph.D. students, working independently from each other, a third phase starts: the two analysis will systematically be compared. The differences in positions, interests, perspectives, and plans will be worked out very carefully. Various conflict management theories and impact assessment methods will be adopted. The knowledge about the differences as well as about zones of possible agreements helps the moderators to organise the process.

The third phase will be carried out jointly between the upstream and downstream researchers.

This phase will begin with a systematic comparison of the upstream and downstream results. Methods evaluated as being successful in the intrastate setting will be utilised to examine and develop the joint downstream/upstream position. The stakeholder participation in phase two will serve as the basis from which participants for the IPSWs will be selected. This workshop will be organised by the Center for Security Studies & Conflict Research and the Swiss Peace Foundation. The Ph.D. candidates will support the organisation of the workshop and concentrate on the evaluation. Criteria developed in phase two and a before and after assessment of the participants will be used to evaluate the workshop's effectiveness.

Professional secrecy about the workshops results and proceedings is a basic principle of these workshops. This has to be taken into consideration when examining the workshop's results, e.g. only using confidential questionnaires.

The fourth phase will look at the outcome of the project. In order to extend the evaluation of the workshop further than just the before and after assessment, the Nile Basin conflict will be compared to similar river conflict processes where minimal stakeholder participation and no interactive workshops have been carried out. In this way the effect of Single vs. Multi-track conflict management can be examined. In the beginning of the project, general theories and methods were adapted to a specific case, in phase four the reverse happens. The question of how the lessons learned can be integrated into the wider global setting is examined. This will include a monitoring of how the participant's results, gained from the series of IPSWs, are fed into the organisational or governmental cooperative process.

The governmental and organisational view of such workshops will be assessed here as far as possible, again the question of professional secrecy requires careful consideration. The outcome might be twofold - depending on the success of the IPSWs and on the influence the participants will have on the official decision making process: Firstly, the Blue Nile IPSWs have an impact on the internationally supported Blue Nile 2000 Conference series and/or their possible follow-up. Secondly, they may directly feed back to negotiations concerning a new Blue Nile regime which might start between Egypt and Ethiopia including the other riparians at a later stage, too.

In any case, since the conflict potential in the basin is high and still growing, it is worthwhile to try hard about the transformation in order to open a highway for sustainable cooperation.

5. Literature

List of Own Relevant Publications

• Baechler, Günther, Stefan Bellwald and Mohamed Suliman, 1996, Environmental Conflict Management, Approaches and Implications in the Horn of Africa, Working paper, SPPE 5001-0411, Bern and Zurich.
  
  
• Baechler, Günther, 1998, Violence Through Environmental Discrimination, Kluwer, Dordrecht, Boston MA and London.
  
  
• Baechler, Günther, 1999, Environmental Degradation and Violent Conflict: Hypotheses, Research Agenda and Theory-Building. In Suliman M. (ed.), 1999, Ecology, Politics and Violent Conflicts, Zed Books, London and New York, pp 76-112.
  
  
• Libiszewski, Stephan, ENCOP Occasional Paper No. 1.
  
  
• Libiszewski, Stephan, 1996, Water disputes in the Jordan Basin and their Role in the Resolution of the Arab-Israeli Conflict. In Spillmann and Baechler, 1996, vol. II, pp 337-460.
  
  
• Libiszewski, Stephan, 1999, International Conflicts over Freshwater Resources. In Suliman (ed.) 1999 Ecology, Politics and Violent Conflicts, Zed Books, London and New York, pp 115-38.
  
  
• Mason, Simon, 1999, Environmental Conflict Management in the Blue Nile Basin, ECONILE, Application and Research Plan (unpublished).
  
  
• Spillmann, Kurt R., and Günther Baechler (eds.), 1995, Environmental Crisis: Regional Conflicts and Ways of Cooperation, occasional paper no. 14, Environmental and Conflicts Project (ENCOP), Swiss Peace Foundation Bern, Center for Security Studies and Conflict Research ETH Zurich.
  
  
• Spillmann, Kurt R., Günther Baechler, Naigzy Gebremedhin and Mohamed Suliman, 1996, Forschungsplan, Environmental Conflict Management (ECOMAN) research plan,. Theory and Practice of the Resolution of Environmental Induced Conflicts in and between Countries in the Horn of Africa, Forschungsgesuch Abt. IV, Schweizerischer Nationalfonds zur Förderung der wissenschaftlichen Forschung, NFP/SPP, Bern (unpublished).
  
  
• Spillmann, Kurt R, and Günther Baechler (eds.), 1996, Kriegsursache Umweltzerstörung, (Parallelsachtitel ab Band II: Environmental Degradation as a Cause of War), Kriegsursache Umweltzerstörung vol. I; Regional und Länderstudien von Projektmitarbeitern (Regional and Country Studies of Research Fellows), vol. II; Länderstudien von externen Experten (Country Studies of External Experts), vol. III; Final Report of the Environment and Conflicts Project (ENCOP), Verlag Rüegger, Chur and Zurich.
  
  
• Spillmann, Kurt R., Günther Baechler, Yacob Arsano, Seyoum Gebre Selassie, Yusuf Hassen, Musse A. Jibril, Bereket Yebio, and Mohamed Suliman, 1998, SPP Environmental Progress Report 1998, Module: Development and Environment; Environmental Change, Consensus Building and Resource Management in the Horn of Africa (ECOMAN). Swiss National Science Foundation, Bern (unpublished).

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[1] See: Cissé 1998;Zinsli 1998.
[2] Zinsli 1998: 10, 24-25.
[3] Cissé 1998: 6.
[4] See: Flury 1999.
[5] See: Baechler & Spillmann 1996, Bde. I - III; Baechler 1999.
[6] Working definition by the ENCOP team (see: Libiszewski 1992:13).
[7] According to Flury (1999) two categories of individuals and collectivities are to be distinguished: "(1) those who are actively involved or take part directly in resource, conflict and risk management and related social processes, who represent a clientele and defend particular interests, who possess information and expertise for strategy formulation and implementation, who have means to significantly influence "environment-development interactions" and (2) a wider category: those who bear the risks and are affected by the outcomes of the particular resource management issue, that act and, hence, influence the particular resource management issue but do not act as representatives of specific interests." Flury proposes to name category (1): "stakeholders" (german: "Beteiligte") and category (2): "actors" (german: "Betroffene").
[8] Kelman. In Sandole & van der Merwe 1993
[9] Fisher 1997:9.
[10] Montville. In McDonald & Bendahmane 1987:7.
[11] Azar 1990; Faure & Rubin 1993.
[12] Zartman. In Baechler 1999 (forthcoming).
[13] Zartman. In Baechler 1999 (forthcoming).
[14] Ropers 1994.
[15] Pruitt & Rubin, 1986.
[16] Pruitt & Rubin, 1986
[17] Stulberg, 1987.
[18] Susskind & Cruikshank, 1987.
[19] Zartman. In Baechler 1999 (forthcoming).
[20] Zartman. In Baechler 1999 (forthcoming).
[21] Zartman. In Baechler 1999 (forthcoming).
[22] Zartman. In Baechler 1999 (forthcoming).
[23] Spillmann et al. 1996: 3.3. Baechler et al. 1996.
[24] Baechler et al. 1996.
[25] Lederach 1999: 34.
[26] Lederach 1999: 33.
[27] Bercovitch 1986. Keashly & Fisher
[28] Burton 1969, 1979, 1984. Kelman, 1972.
[29] Kelman. In: Baechler 1999 (forthcoming).
[30] Kelman. In: Baechler 1999 (forthcoming).
[31] Kelman 1996.
[32] Fisher 1997: 62
[33] Azar 1990. .
[34] Kelman 1994. See also: Burton 1990. Fisher 1997. Azar 1990.
[35] See: Mason 1999.
[36] See: Mason 1999.